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ABSTRACT 
General deterrence theory suggests that deterrent security countermeasures (e.g., security policies, security awareness 
programs, security software) can be used to control IS misuse in organizations. However, empirical studies that have 
examined the effectiveness of such techniques have produced inconclusive results. A limitation of these studies is that they 
ignore the impacts of sanction perceptions and individual characteristics on IS misuse behavior. The purpose of this paper is 
to reconcile the discrepant findings of prior research by introducing a conceptual model that proposes a relationship between 
deterrent security countermeasures, sanction perceptions, individual characteristics, and IS misuse. The model includes the 
following propositions: (i) deterrent security countermeasures increase perceived certainty and severity of sanctions, which 
leads to lower IS misuse intention; (ii) the relationship between deterrent countermeasures and perceived certainty and 
severity of sanctions is moderated by an individual’s computer self-efficacy, computer experience, gender, age, risk 
propensity, and employment context.  
Keywords 
IS security, computer abuse, IS misuse, general deterrence theory 
INTRODUCTION 
Employee misuse of information systems (IS) represents a very real and costly threat to organizations. The most recent 
CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey (Power, 2003) reports that 45% of industry and government respondents face 
IS security incidents due to the actions of legitimate users, with estimated losses as high as $100,000 per incident. This same 
group of respondents estimates over $11 million in losses due to insider abuse of network access. Further, the percentage of 
IS security incidents from inside the organization has risen steadily from 37% in 1999 to 45% in 2003. There is evidence that 
this trend is likely to continue in the future. The computer literacy of organizational staffs has increased over the years, 
creating sophisticated users of technology. An undesirable side effect of this increased sophistication is that users are 
becoming adept at committing various types of computer abuse (Straub and Nance, 1990).  
 
While internal IS security incidents no longer outnumber externally initiated security incidents (Power, 2002), the insider 
threat remains the greatest single risk to organizations. Most security experts agree that more successful attacks come from 
inside the organization than from the outside and that insider attacks are potentially more costly (Schultz, 2002; Shaw, Ruby, 
and Post, 1998). Researchers have suggested that organizations engage in deterrent efforts in order to control IS misuse 
(Dhillon, 1999; Parker, 1981). Parker (1981) was an early advocate of procedural deterrents, such as guidelines and policy 
statements, in lowering IS misuse by white-collar amateurs. More recently, researchers have suggested that organizations 
adopt a mix of procedural (e.g., security policies, acceptable usage guidelines, security awareness programs) and technical 
(e.g., access controls, user ID/passwords, biometric controls) deterrent countermeasures. The general theory of deterrence 
from the field of criminology provides theoretical justification for the use of deterrent countermeasures as a means to limit 
the incidence of IS misuse in organizations. The theory argues that the use of deterrent countermeasures will increase 
individuals’ perceptions of the likelihood and severity of punishment and therefore dissuade them from engaging in illegal 
and/or illicit computing behaviors.  
 
Straub (1990) empirically tested the general deterrence theory and found that use of deterrent countermeasures (e.g., 
distributed policy statements that specify conditions for proper system use and security software) was associated with lower 
levels of IS misuse. However, research that has explored the impact of deterrent techniques on individual IS misuse behavior 
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has been inconclusive. A possible explanation for these equivocal results is that prior studies have not assessed the impact of 
deterrent countermeasures on individual perceptions of punishment certainty and severity, which, according to general 
deterrence theory, have a direct influence on abusive behavior intentions. Moreover, several individual characteristics that 
influence perceptions of punishment have not been considered.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to reconcile the discrepant findings of prior IS deterrence research by introducing a conceptual 
model that proposes a relationship between deterrent security countermeasures, sanction perceptions, individual 
characteristics, and IS misuse behavior. In particular, the paper includes the following propositions: (i) deterrent security 
countermeasures increase perceived certainty and severity of sanctions associated with IS misuse, which leads to lower IS 
misuse intentions; (ii) the relationship between deterrent countermeasures and perceived certainty and severity of sanctions 
is moderated by an individual’s computer self-efficacy, computer experience, gender, age, risk propensity, and employment 
context. The proposed model provides a better understanding of the impact of security countermeasures on IS misuse and 
should also assist managers in determining appropriate uses for IS security countermeasures.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a definition of IS misuse. This is followed by a 
review of prior studies that have assessed the impact of security countermeasures on IS misuse and potential explanations for 
the inconclusive results of previous research. Next, the paper’s model and propositions are presented. The final section 
includes implications of the proposed model for researchers and practitioners as well as possible methodological approaches 
for empirical testing.  
 
DEFINITION OF IS MISUSE 
IS misuse can be a very subjective term, ranging from behaviors that are unethical and/or inappropriate (e.g., inappropriate 
use of e-mail and Internet privileges) to those that are illegal (e.g., stealing company information). Examples of IS misuse 
include theft or modification of computer programs, embezzlement or modification of data, unauthorized use of computer 
services, purposeful interruption of computer services, inadequate control of media, unauthorized access to passwords, and 
destruction of data by computer viruses (Foltz, 2000; Straub, 1990). This paper adopts a broad definition of IS misuse as “the 
intentional misuse of computer systems by users who are authorized to access those systems and networks” (Schultz, 2002, p. 
526). This definition can include behaviors that are considered illegal, inappropriate, and unethical in the context of IS 
(Leonard and Cronan, 2001).  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior studies have used the lens of general deterrence theory (GDT) from the field of criminology to assess the effectiveness 
of various security countermeasures in lowering IS misuse. GDT predicts that “disincentives” or sanctions dissuade potential 
offenders from illegal behavior and that as the certainty and severity of sanctions increase, the level of illegal behaviors 
should decrease (Gibbs, 1975). Within the realm of IS, GDT predicts that use of deterrent security countermeasures (e.g., 
security policies and guidelines, security awareness programs, preventative security software) will lower IS misuse by 
convincing potential abusers that there is too high a certainty of getting caught and punished severely (Straub and Welke, 
1998). 
 
Straub (1990) used a GDT-based theoretical framework to empirically test the effectiveness of deterrent and preventative 
security countermeasures in lowering computer misuse. Survey responses from IS personnel in 1,211 randomly selected 
organizations indicated that higher levels of deterrent (e.g., number of information sources, number of security staff hours per 
week) and preventative (e.g., screen access to a system to admit authorized users only and use of security software) security 
controls were associated with lower levels of misuse. In addition, use of more comprehensive preventative security software 
was found to be associated with greater ability to identify perpetrators of abuse and to discover more serious computer 
misuse incidents (Nance and Straub, 1988).  Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, and Wei (2003) also tested the effectiveness of deterrent 
and preventative measures on IS security effectiveness. Consistent with GDT, the researchers found that greater 
organizational deterrent efforts (in the form of man-hours expended on IS security purposes) and preventative efforts (in the 
form of more advanced security software) were associated with higher perceived IS security effectiveness.  
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In contrast to organizational-level studies, studies that have tested the effectiveness of deterrent countermeasures on 
individual IS misuse behavior have produced mixed results. Straub, Carlson, and Jones (1993) conducted a field study to 
examine the impact of deterrent efforts in preventing student cheating on out-of-class computer programming assignments. 
Results showed that deterrent efforts (e.g., dissemination of definition of computer abuse and rules governing punishment) 
combined with public warnings of sanctions were effective in deterring cheating behavior. Foltz (2000) assessed the before 
and after effects of a university computer usage policy and found that the policy had no effect on IS misuse intentions and 
behaviors involving modifying, stealing, or destroying software and data. Harrington (1996) assessed the influence of codes 
of ethics on computer abuse intentions among IS employees and found that codes had a deterrent effect only for those 
individuals that were high in a psychological trait called responsibility denial. Thus, Harrington’s results suggest that the 
impacts of deterrents are contingent on individual characteristics. 
 
In summary, while prior organizational-level studies provide strong evidence of the effectiveness of deterrent 
countermeasures in lowering IS misuse, research that has explored the impact of deterrent techniques on individual IS misuse 
behavior has been inconclusive.  
 
A limitation of prior IS deterrence studies is that they have failed to assess the impact of deterrent countermeasures on 
individual perceptions of punishment certainty and severity, which, according to general deterrence theory, have a direct 
influence on abusive behavior intentions. The deterrence literature argues that it is the perceptions of sanctions rather than the 
sanctions themselves that lead to deterrence (Gibb, 1975; Tittle, 1980). The impact of sanctions or sanctioning practices on 
criminal behavior works through perceived certainty and perceived severity of sanctions. Objective properties of sanctions 
influence perceived certainty and severity of sanction, which in turn affect behavior (Richards and Tittle, 1981). This 
suggests that the impact of deterrent security countermeasures on IS misuse behavior is dependent upon the countermeasures’ 
ability to influence an individual’s perception of sanction risk (e.g., getting caught and getting punished). Straub (1990) and 
Kankanhalli et al. (2003) both recognize the importance of sanction perceptions in their studies. However, neither study 
includes measures of sanction perceptions as variables. Straub (1990) contends that objective measures of deterrents and 
preventatives serve as surrogates for perceived certainty and severity of sanctions since “deterrent security activities represent 
how potential abusers perceive risk” (Straub, 1990, p. 258). Similarly, Kankanhalli et al. (2003) assert that “deterrent efforts 
correspond to certainty of sanctions because the amount of such efforts directly affects the probability that IS abusers will be 
caught” (p. 141). However, the deterrence literature suggests that objective measures may not serve as adequate surrogates 
for perceived certainty and severity of sanctions since perceptions of sanction characteristics can vary independently of 
objective sanction characteristics (Gibbs, 1975; Tittle, 1980). Therefore, individual perceptions of the threats imposed by 
deterrent security countermeasures may not be directly proportional to the actual level of countermeasures employed in an 
organization. The model presented in this paper accounts for sanction perceptions by including perceived certainty and 
severity of sanctions as links between deterrent security countermeasures and IS misuse intentions.  
 
Another concern of prior IS deterrence studies is that they have not accounted for the impact of individual characteristics on 
the relationship between security countermeasures and IS misuse. With the exception of Harrington (1996), prior IS 
deterrence studies have implicitly assumed that the impact of deterrent countermeasures is the same for all individuals. 
Existing research suggests that this may be a false assumption, as sanctions have been shown to have different deterrence 
values for persons with different perspectives on the law, morality, and/or the threat of punishment itself (Silberman, 1976). 
Variables such as age, gender, risk propensity, expertise, socioeconomic status, race, geographic mobility, and labor force 
status have all been shown to influence perceptions of sanctions and projected deviant and criminal behavior (Hollinger and 
Clark, 1989; Tittle, 1980; Weaver and Carroll, 1989). Deterrence researchers have called for a greater emphasis on 
understanding the factors that influence sanction perceptions in order to identify the conditions under which sanctions are 
likely to be important influences on behavior (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001). Peace, Galletta, and Thong (2003) also suggest the 
need for further research to understand what influences sanction perceptions in the context of IS. The model presented in this 
paper includes the moderating impacts of computer self-efficacy, computer experience, gender, age, risk propensity, and 
employee context on the effectiveness of deterrent security countermeasures.  
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PROPOSED MODEL 
Using the framework of GDT, this paper presents a model that explores the impact of deterrent security countermeasures on 
sanction perceptions, which in turn predict IS misuse behavior intentions. The model also considers individual characteristics 
that moderate the relationship between deterrent countermeasures and sanction perceptions. The complete model is illustrated 
in Figure 1 and the proposed relationships are discussed in the following sections.    
 
 
 
Perceived certainty 
of sanctions
Security countermeasures
-security policies
-security awareness program
-security software
Perceived severity of 
sanctions
IS misuse
intention
Individual characteristics
-computer self-efficacy
-computer experience
-gender
-age
-risk propensity
Employment context
-permanent/temporary(contract)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A Model Linking Deterrent Security Countermeasures to IS Misuse Intention 
 
A prominent finding from over 30 years of deterrence research is that sanction fear has consistently been able to predict 
various criminal and deviant behaviors (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001; Tittle, 1980). Sanction fear is typically measured using 
two primary constructs: certainty of sanction and severity of sanction. The certainty of sanction refers to the probability of 
being punished, and the severity of sanction refers to the degree of punishment (Gibbs, 1975). Tittle (1980) found that 
sanction fear was negatively associated with intention to engage in several socially deviant behaviors (e.g., lying to one’s 
spouse, sitting during the national anthem, smoking marijuana) as well as deviant behavior in the workplace (e.g., making 
personal use of an employer’s equipment). Hollinger and Clark (1983) found that employees who perceived lower certainty 
and severity of organizational sanctions were more likely to steal from their employers. IS misuse is typically characterized 
as an amateur, white-collar crime or antisocial behavior (Parker, 1981; Straub, 1990). Therefore, both perceived certainty and 
severity of sanctions should be inversely related to IS misuse behavior:  
 
P1: Perceived certainty and severity of sanctions are both negatively associated with IS misuse behavior.  
 
Deterrence research posits that objective properties of sanctions influence perceived severity and certainty of sanction, which 
in turn affect behavior (Richards and Tittle, 1981). In terms of IS security, this suggests that active and visible deterrent 
efforts can convince potential abusers of the certainty and severity of punishment. Straub (1990) identifies security policies, 
security awareness programs, and security systems as examples of countermeasures that organizations can employ to control 
IS misuse. Security policies are meant to deter IS misuse by clearly defining unacceptable or illegal conduct, thereby 
increasing the perceived threat of punishment (Lee and Lee, 2002). Security awareness programs convey knowledge about 
risks in the organizational environment and emphasize actions taken by the firm, including policies and sanctions for 
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violations. A major reason for such programs is to convince potential abusers that the company is serious about securing its 
systems and will not treat intentional breaches of security lightly (Straub and Welke, 1998). Thus, security awareness 
programs stress both the certainty and severity of sanctioning. Security systems (e.g., access controls, user ID/passwords) 
directly impact misuse behavior by preventing access to information resources. However, Straub and Welke (1998) argue that 
security software also has a deterrent effect on future misuse by convincing potential offenders of the certainty and severity 
of punishment. Therefore, the following is proposed:  
 
P2: Deterrent security countermeasures (e.g., security policies, security awareness programs, and security software) are 
positively associated with both perceived certainty and severity of sanctions.  
 
Prior research suggests that the relationship between security countermeasures and sanction perceptions is moderated by 
individual characteristics (Tittle, 1980; Harrington, 1996). Based on a review of the IS security, criminology, and risk 
behavior literatures, individual factors that should logically influence the degree to which security countermeasures influence 
sanction perceptions are discussed below.  
 
Research that has examined risky decision making among various groups suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between perceptions of self-efficacy and risk-taking behavior (Dulebohn, 2002; Wyatt, 1990). Laboratory research by 
Kruegar and Dickinson (1994) suggests that self-efficacy influences risk taking behavior through opportunity recognition. 
They found that an increase in self-efficacy increases perceptions of opportunity and decreases perceptions of threat and that 
changing opportunities of threat perceptions changes risk taking behavior. Given that IS misuse is a risky behavior, the 
preceding discussion suggests that individuals with high self-efficacy have lower perceptions of threats pertaining to IS 
misuse and therefore are less likely to be deterred by security countermeasures. However, IS misuse is unique in that the 
ability to perform such behaviors requires some level of computer skills. Therefore, this model includes computer self-
efficacy instead of general self-efficacy since the behaviors being studied involve the use of IS resources. Computer self-
efficacy is defined as “individuals’ judgment of their computer-related skills in diverse situations” (Compeau and Higgins, 
1995, p. 192). The above discussion suggests the following proposition:   
 
P3: Computer self-efficacy moderates the effect of deterrent security countermeasures on both perceived certainty and 
severity of sanctions. Compared with individuals with low computer self-efficacy, individuals with high computer self-efficacy 
will perceive less certainty and severity of sanctions in response to deterrent security countermeasures.  
 
In addition to perceptions of computer-related skills, there is also suggestive evidence that actual levels of computing skills 
impact threat perceptions and therefore influence the effectiveness of security countermeasures in controlling IS misuse. 
Loch and Conger (1996) found that an individual’s level of computer literacy was a significant influence on ethical decision-
making involving the use of computers. Weaver and Carroll (1985) studied behaviors of experienced and novice shoplifters 
and found that perceptions of the likelihood of sanctions were much stronger for novices. Novice shoplifters were generally 
more fearful of punishment and more easily deterred. Experienced shoplifters perceived greater opportunities for shoplifting 
and were less deterred by retailer tactics such as mirrors, cameras, and visible sales personnel. Together, these results suggest 
that deterrent security countermeasures are less likely to increase sanction perceptions for IS misuse among highly trained or 
experienced computer users. This leads to the following proposition:  
 
P4: Computer experience moderates the effect of deterrent security countermeasures on both perceived certainty and severity 
of sanctions. Compared with individuals with less computer experience, individuals with more computer experience will 
perceive less certainty and severity of sanctions in response to deterrent security countermeasures.  
 
The deterrence literature has consistently shown that the impact of sanctions is weaker on men than women (Tittle, 1980). 
Richards and Tittle (1981) surveyed respondents on the probability that they would be arrested if they were to commit six 
crimes ranging from minor theft (worth about $5) to assault (physically harming someone on purpose) and found that the 
perceived risk of arrest was lower among men for all six offenses. Hollinger and Clark (1983) found that men were more 
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likely to steal from their employers. Within the IS literature, empirical results have shown that men are more likely to commit 
software piracy (Kreie and Cronan, 1998) and engage in numerous unethical behaviors involving the use of computers 
(Gattiker and Kelley, 1999; Leonard and Cronan, 2001; Loch and Conger, 1996). Considered together, the above findings 
suggest that men perceive less risk in committing IS misuse and therefore are less likely than women to perceive certainty 
and severity of sanctions in response to deterrent security countermeasures.  
 
P5: Gender moderates the effect of deterrent security countermeasures on both perceived certainty and severity of sanctions. 
Compared with women, men will perceive less certainty and severity of sanctions in response to deterrent security 
countermeasures.  
 
Another individual characteristic that has been consistently shown to influence sanction perceptions is age. Tittle (1980) 
found that age was inversely related to deviance intentions in seventeen of the eighteen behaviors he studied. Dulebohn 
(2002) found a negative association between age and risk tolerance in selecting investment options in an employee-sponsored 
retirement plan. Hollinger and Clark (1983) found that perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment for stealing 
from an employer were much lower among younger (under 25) employees. The IS literature also suggests that age impacts 
sanction perceptions. Young employees have been shown more likely to pirate software and engage in unethical computing 
behavior (Gattiker and Kelley, 1999). These results suggest that younger employees perceive less risk of sanctions for 
committing IS misuse and that the impact of security countermeasures on sanction perceptions is inversely related to age.  
 
P6: Age moderates the effect of deterrent security countermeasures on both perceived certainty and severity of sanctions. 
Compared with older people, younger people will perceive less certainty and severity of sanctions in response to deterrent 
security countermeasures.  
 
Zimring and Hawkins (1973) maintain that those who have a high propensity toward risk will be less deterred than those who 
avoid risks. Risk propensity can be defined as the tendency of a decision maker to take risky actions (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). 
It is an enduring and persistent individual trait that is consistent across various situations, although some researchers argue 
that it can change over time as a result of experience (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995). If an individual has a high risk-taking 
propensity, (s)he may tend to underestimate the risks involved in a situation. Conversely, an individual with a low risk-taking 
propensity will weigh negative outcomes more highly, leading to heightened perception of risk. Sitkin and Weingart (1995) 
found a positive relationship between risk propensity and risky decision making among student subjects in a laboratory 
experiment. In the context of IS misuse, this literature suggests that individuals with higher risk propensities will perceive 
less sanction risk from security countermeasures than those that have lower risk propensities. This leads to the following 
proposition: 
 
P7: Risk propensity moderates the effect of deterrent security countermeasures on both perceived certainty and severity of 
sanctions. Compared with individuals with low risk propensity, high risk propensity individuals will perceive less certainty 
and severity of sanctions in response to deterrent security countermeasures 
 
Prior deterrence studies have shown a relationship between employment context and deviant behaviors. Tittle (1980) found 
increased proneness toward deviant behavior among part-time employees of an organization and also found that individuals 
who moved more often were more likely to engage in occupational specific deviance (e.g., making personal use of an 
employer’s equipment). These results suggest that employment context may have a significant impact on sanction 
perceptions associated with IS misuse. The number of temporary (contract) workers that comprise organizational staffs 
continues to rise, especially as a result of outsourcing arrangements (Winter and Gill, 2001). Temporary (contract) workers 
are employed by a third party and not by the businesses in which they are performing their work. Therefore, it seems 
plausible that temporary workers would perceive fewer sanction risks for committing IS misuse. Moreover, temporary 
workers are highly transient, which Tittle (1980) suggests leads to freer behavior and less conformity with organizational 
norms. Ang and Slaughter (2000) studied the differences between permanent and temporary contract workers on software 
development teams and found that contract workers were perceived by their supervisors as less loyal, obedient, and 
trustworthy. Thus, it is proposed that:   
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P8: Employment context moderates the effect of deterrent security countermeasures on both perceived certainty and severity 
of sanctions. Compared with individuals who are permanent employees of an organization, temporary (contract) workers 
will perceive less certainty and severity of sanctions in response to deterrent security countermeasures.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper advances a model of the effect of deterrent security countermeasures on IS misuse behavior. It is argued that this 
effect is mediated by perceptions of the certainty and severity of sanctions for committing IS misuse. In addition, computer 
self-efficacy, computer experience, gender, age, risk propensity, and employment context are proposed to moderate the 
relationship between deterrent security countermeasures and sanction perceptions. The model is based on the idea that 
sanction perceptions and individual variables explain, in part, the inconclusive results reported in previous IS deterrence 
studies.  
 
This research contributes to the IS security literature by incorporating several individual variables into the relationship 
between deterrent security countermeasures and IS misuse behavior. These variables have not been considered in prior 
studies. In addition, the proposed model provides guidance to managers on the specific conditions where deterrent security 
countermeasures may or may not be effective. This research is needed, as Straub and Welke (1998) found that managers are 
generally not aware of the deterrent techniques available for controlling IS misuse.  
 
The next step is to test the propositions presented in this paper. Tittle (1980) suggests the use of survey questions that ask for 
future IS misuse intentions since asking for future intentions establishes time precedence and helps in establishing causal 
order. However, direct questions about engaging/not engaging in IS misuse may not be appropriate due to the sensitive nature 
of the behaviors in question. A more suitable option may be the use of scenarios involving different forms of IS misuse. 
Scenarios have the advantage of providing a less intimidating way to respond to sensitive issues and offer realistic situations 
that place the subject in a decision-making role (Gattiker and Kelley, 1999). Moreover, scenarios avoid the subject’s 
tendency to try to gain experimenter approval and so are commonly used in deterrence research (Harrington, 1996). 
Controlled laboratory experiments, field studies, and simulations offer additional methodological approaches for empirical 
testing. 
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